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Science, Politics, Law and the Arc of the Clean Water Act: 
The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark 
 
Robert L. Glicksman* & Matthew R. Batzel** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 As the 1960s drew to a close, the nation’s surface water resources were heavily polluted.  
In the first of a three-part series of articles on public regulation of water quality, Professor 
William Hines found that “[p]ollution invades our waters in such a noxious variety of forms as to 
nearly defy description.”1  According to Hines, most of the surface waters within the United 
States were only marginally suitable for even low-quality uses such as irrigation, stockwatering, 
and industrial intake, “and many of our waters are so contaminated as to be offensive to sight and 
smell.”2  The problem, however, extended beyond aesthetical niceties.  Hines cited to warnings 
by public health officials that water pollution rendered the country vulnerable to serious health 
problems arising from “the disease carrying capacity of our polluted watercourses.”3  He asserted 
that the need to control water quality “raises a kaleidoscopic array of scientific, economic, 
political and social issues,”4 and he characterized the effort to control water pollution as “the 
                                                 
*
 J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, The George Washington University Law School.  The 
authors thank Robert Adler, William Andreen, and Victor Flatt for helpful comments on drafts of this article 
**
 Senior Associate, Marks Nelson Vohland Campbell & Radetic LLC; J.D., University of Kansas School of Law, 
2008. 
1
 N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part I: State Pollution Control 
Programs, 52 IOWA L. REV. 186, 186 (1966) [hereinafter Hines I].  The other two components of Hines’ trilogy are 
Part II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IOWA L. REV. 432 (1966), and Part III: The Federal 
Effect, 52 IOWA L. REV. 799 (1967) [hereinafter Hines III]. 
2
 Hines I, supra note 1, at 189.  Professor Hines defined water pollution in terms of unsuitability of the resource for 
desired human uses.  Id. at 188 (stating that “pollution of water simply means that the quality of the resource is 
lower than that reasonably required for the uses to which it would otherwise be put”). 
3
 Id.  According to the Centers for Disease Control, hundreds of thousands of people become ill and hundreds die 
each year in the United States due to exposure to pathogenic organisms in drinking water.  Chemical pollution also 
gives rise to public health concerns.  See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, 
DANIEL R. MANDELKER & A. DAN TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 801 (5th ed. 2007). 
4
 Hines I, supra note 1, at 186. 
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latest problem in a long series of conflicts between private enterprise and public interest in the 
use of natural resources.”5 
 Congress responded to the water pollution problem described by Professor Hines by 
adopting the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, now known as the 
Clean Water Act (CWA).6  On its face, the CWA is an ambitious effort to rid the nation’s surface 
waters of pollution.  Its stated objective “is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,”7 and its goal is to eliminate the discharge of 
pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.8  In the interim, the statute strives, “wherever 
attainable,” to provide for waters capable of protecting fish and wildlife and supporting 
recreation (the so-called “fishable-swimmable waters” goal).9  Nearly five decades after its 
enactment, surface water quality has improved considerably, but serious problems remain, and 
the goal of eliminating surface water pollution seems chimerical. 
 This essay examines the assumptions upon which Congress relied in enacting the CWA 
and the extent to which they have been borne out or belied as the federal and state governments 
have implemented their CWA responsibilities in the quest to achieve acceptably clean water.  
Part II briefly traces the development of federal water pollution control legislation before 1972, 
highlighting the deficiencies that contributed to the need for a new approach in 1972.  Part III 
examines the scientific and technical, political, and legal assumptions that helped shape the 1972 
CWA in an effort to determine whether the failure to achieve fully the statute’s goals is inherent 
in the statute’s design or is more likely the result of the law’s incomplete implementation.  Part 
                                                 
5
 Id. at 195. 
6
 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).  A year before the publication of Professor Hines’ trilogy, Congress enacted the 
Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903, which was a predecessor of the modern CWA. 
7
 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
8
 Id. § 1251(a)(1). 
9
 Id. § 1251(a)(2). 
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IV provides an assessment of how water quality conditions today compare both with those that 
existed in 1972 and with the goals that Congress identified in the CWA.  Part V speculates about 
the future direction of water pollution control law.  We conclude that a surprisingly large share 
of the assumptions upon which Congress built the CWA were valid and have helped to make the 
statute an environmental success story.  The statute’s failure to perform even more admirably 
than it has is due largely to a lack of legislative clarity in addressing the role of wetlands in 
preserving the integrity of aquatic ecosystems and to Congress’ unwillingness to adopt, or force 
the states to adopt, measures to control nonpoint source pollution. 
 
II. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LEGISLATION BEFORE 1972 
 The story of pre-1972 federal water pollution legislation is one of incremental 
enhancement of federal responsibility and control.  Although the Supreme Court in a series of 
decisions in the 1960s10 converted the River and Harbors Act of 189911 into a vehicle for 
controlling water pollution, the statute was adopted primarily as a device to protect navigation.12  
The first significant piece of legislation adopted with the aim of reducing water pollution was the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.13  Before World War II, water pollution control 
was regarded as a state and local responsibility.14  The 1948 statute expanded the federal 
government’s role by, among other things, authorizing it to take action to abate interstate 
pollution.15  By the mid-1960s, Congress was ready to further expand the federal role, in part 
because of the “almost total lack of enforcement” of the 1948 statute (which depended on 
                                                 
10
 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v. Republic Steel Co., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).  
See also United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Co., 411 U.S. 655, 670-71 (1973). 
11
 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006).  That statute prohibited discharge of “refuse matter” without a permit from the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers. 
12
 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 586-87. 
13
 Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
14
 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 586. 
15
 Id. at 587. 
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cooperation by the states).16  In addition, by that time the northern states were concerned that 
southern and western states were trying to lure industry with lax regulation.  They therefore 
supported the establishment of a federal regulatory floor to combat the further migration of 
industry to the south and west.17 
 The Water Quality Act of 196518 required all states to designate intended uses for 
interstate water bodies within their jurisdiction and then adopt water quality standards that would 
allow each body to meet its intended use.  States also had to craft plans to implement the 
standards.    The standards were enforceable (in theory) by the federal government.19  The statute 
failed to make a significant dent in interstate water pollution.  By 1970, half of the states still had 
not adopted the water quality standards required by the 1965 Act.20 Even when the states 
committed to meeting their statutory responsibilities, they often lacked the scientific information 
necessary to determine the appropriate pollutant concentrations needed to support the designated 
use and to convert the maximum concentrations into a series of effluent limits on individual 
dischargers.  These difficulties hampered both the establishment and enforcement of effluent 
limits, as dischargers contested cause-and-effect linkages between their discharges and extant 
water quality problems at both stages of the process.21   
                                                 
16
 S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672. 
17
 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 587. 
18
 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). 
19
 JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 141 (2d ed. 2007). 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id.; Oliver A. Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 17 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 163, 168 (2003).  See also Khristine L. Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REV. 609, 611-12 (1978) (“Establishing an effective water 
quality standard was a cumbersome process, and many states resisted implementing effective standards.”).  Carol 
Rose has described the “tentative efforts to contain harmful impacts on the environment” made by the states in the 
“pre-history” stage before adoption of the CWA in 1972, noting that “the states were supposed to set water quality 
standards for different bodies of water.  But these . . . approaches did not in fact work very well to improve water 
quality.  The problem was that once the standards were set, nothing much happened.  It was just too hard to connect 
deterioration in water quality to any particular responsible party.”  Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up 
(More or Less), and What Science Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 277 (2005).  Cf. Kenneth M. 
Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: 
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 The Senate Committee on Public Works, which had jurisdiction over the legislation that 
was eventually adopted as the 1972 CWA, concluded after lengthy study “that the national effort 
to abate and control water pollution has been inadequate in every vital aspect.”22  Some states 
had taken the initiative to respond to the water pollution problems that they had clearly identified 
and understood well with some success.23  Both industrial and municipal dischargers were 
continuing to dispose of large (and growing) quantities of waste into surface waters, however, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 534 (2005) (noting that before 1972 
“approximately half of the states had adopted water quality standards, but the federal legislation failed to compel 
meaningful progress toward achieving those standards”); James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate 
Cause: Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other 
Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 600  n.11 (2003) (deeming pre-1972 implementation of state water 
quality programs “mostly a failure”); Scott D. Anderson, Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: 
The Massachusetts Approach, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 339, 342 (1999) (concluding that before 1972, “the 
practice of states establishing acceptable concentrations of pollutants for different water bodies did not result in 
noticeable improvements in water quality. . . .  [N]ot only were few states setting specific water quality standards, 
but many problems arose when states implemented these standards − including problems of determining when a 
discharge violated an established standard, and with identifying ways to allocate effluent limitations among different 
polluters.  Moreover, industry commonly pressured states to reclassify their waterways to allow a greater pollutant 
load.”); Ana M. Babigian, Note and Comment, Medical Waste: A Loaded Gun on the Verge of Firing: United States 
v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1063, 1065-66 (arguing that the pre-1972 water quality 
standard  “system proved to be inadequate, since it possessed a limited, unclear scope, suffered from administrative 
problems, and lacked a permitting process”). 
22
 S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674.  See also EPA v. Calif. ex rel. Water 
Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 (1976).  One of the authors of this article was reminded almost daily of the 
sorry state of the quality of some of the nation’s surface water bodies, having grown up in the 1950s and 1960s 
within a mile of a river that, even in 2009, was described as “[a] toxic cocktail of dioxin, sewage, heavy metals and 
industrial chemicals left behind by factories, tanneries, smelters and refineries,” “a toxic disgrace,” a river whose 
last “increasingly foul and dispiriting [80] miles” devolve into “a dark, malodorous industrial sink,” and “a pretty 
decisive argument against human perfectibility.”  Peter Applebome, In One Day, Saddening Reminders of a River’s 
Murky History, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009.  An environmental group spokesperson noted, however, that “the river, 
however foul, is cleaner than it was when, like the [Cuyahoga] in Cleveland, it could catch fire.”  Id.  The quality of 
the Cuyahoga River near Cleveland, meanwhile, has improved markedly since the late 1960s and is now home to 
more than sixty species of fish.  See Christopher Maag, From the Ashes of 1969, a River is Reborn, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 21, 2009 (quoting a river specialist describing the river’s “amazing comeback”).  At the same time, forty years 
after the Cuyahoga caught fire on June 22, 1969, EPA denied a request to remove a large part of the river from the 
list of water bodies not meeting state water quality standards because it was still failing to meet EPA standards in 
eight of fourteen locations for determining whether a river is healthy (such as the number of fish advisories).  
Michael Scott, U.S. EPA: Cuyahoga River Has Made Strides but Stays on List of Polluted North American 
Waterways, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 23, 2009. 
23
 EPA’s initial national water quality inventory, which was conducted in 1973, found that there had been substantial 
improvement in water quality in major waterways over the last decade, at least with regard to the pollutants of 
greatest concern at the time:  organic waste and bacteria. A. Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC 
POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 114 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990); Jonathan Adler, The Fable of 
Federal Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 93, 96–97 (2004) [hereinafter Adler, Fable]. 
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and enforcement was so sporadic and ineffective that it failed to serve as a deterrent.24  Congress 
responded in 1972 by amending the 1948 and 1965 Acts through the adoption of the first version 
of the modern CWA. 
 
III. THE SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THE 1972 CLEAN 
WATER ACT 
 The Senate Committee on Public Works provided both the backdrop for and an 
explanation of the aims of the 1972 legislation.  It denounced past federal water pollution control 
efforts as “sporadic, inconsistent, and improvised on an ad hoc basis.”25  It described the purpose 
of the 1972 CWA as the establishment of “a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination 
of water pollution, making it clear to industry and municipalities alike the pollution control 
performance which will be expected over the next decade.”26  The Act’s ambitious objective, as 
indicated above, was to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the Nation’s waters” through the elimination of all pollutant discharges by 1985.27 
 In hindsight, the goal of eliminating all surface water pollution within thirteen years of 
the CWA’s adoption appears to be wildly aspirational, and perhaps even to amount to foolhardy 
optimism.  It is hard to escape the question of whether those who fashioned that goal operated 
under serious misconceptions about the nature of water pollution and an industrial society’s 
                                                 
24
 William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for Vigorous Federal 
Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 202-03 (1987) [hereinafter Andreen, Exhortation] 
(stating that, “confronted by the  twin evils of severe water quality degradation and a failed federal initiative to 
control it, Congress opted to discard the earlier federal program and chart a new, more effective course”).  See also 
William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States − State, Local, and Federal 
Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 261-62 (2003) [hereinafter Andreen, Evolution II] (quoting 
Senator Edmund Muskie’s view that “spotty” enforcement required a new approach that required “tougher 
enforcement”). 
25
 S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3758. 
26
 Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3758. 
27
 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
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ability to control it.  This part explores what assumptions drove Congress to adopt the 1972 
CWA and how those assumptions affected the scope and character of the supposedly 
“comprehensive” statutory program that emerged. 
A. Scientific and Technical Assumptions 
 Numerous judgments face policymakers designing a pollution control program such as 
the CWA.  Mistaken or misguided assumptions can sabotage a program before it even gets off 
the ground.  This section addresses the scientific and technical assumptions and determinations 
that seem to have driven Congress to adopt a statute whose essential characteristics include a 
foundational “no discharge” goal, an objective of restoring and maintaining aquatic ecosystem 
integrity, a first line of defense against water pollution that relies on a set of technology-based 
rather than water quality-based controls, a virtual failure to address nonpoint source pollution, 
and an aquatic development control program that fails to mention the term wetlands even once. 
  1. The Viability of the “No Discharge” Goal 
 Did anyone who voted for the 1972 CWA really think that the statute would be capable 
of eliminating all discharges of surface water pollution by 1985?  If so, they clearly failed to 
anticipate the scope of the task.  Several competing theories emerge that support the conclusion 
that it is unlikely that the supporters of the CWA in Congress labored under the impression that 
the no discharge goal would become a reality by 1985. 
 The first possibility is that those who crafted and voted for the no discharge goal did so 
not because they thought achieving it was a realistic possibility but because they sought to make 
a moral statement that pollution of the nation’s water resources was unacceptable.28  There is 
some flavor of that sentiment in the legislative history.  A Senate report attributes to the no 
                                                 
28
 SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 142-43 (describing “moral outrage, not pragmatic cost-benefit 
considerations,” as the motivating influence of federal pollution control legislation in the 1970s).  See generally 
John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOL. L.Q. 233 (1990). 
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discharge goal a desire to “clearly establish that no one has the right to pollute − that pollution 
continues because of technological limits, not because of any inherent right to use the nation’s 
waterways for the purpose of disposing of waste.”29  A related possibility is that the CWA’s 
supporters knew full well that it would be impossible to meet the no discharge goal by 1985, but 
they codified such a lofty goal anyway so that when practical and political realities surfaced that 
required a retreat from the stated goal, the result would nevertheless be acceptable water 
quality.30  Had the statute established a less absolute goal, the fallback position, too, would have 
been less protective.31  Yet another possibility is that the no discharge goal allowed those who 
voted for it to present themselves to constituents as protectors of the environment, while at the 
same time to assure industries whose support they needed in future elections that the operative 
provisions of the statute fell far short of the stated aspirations.32 
 But the CWA’s legislative history suggests another reason why Congress may have 
codified a no discharge goal along with a set of substantive provisions clearly inadequate to the 
                                                 
29
 S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3709.  Cf. Friends of the Everglades v. South-
Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 2009 WL 1545551, at *15 (11th Cir. June 4, 2009) (noting that some of the CWA’s 
substantive provisions “do not comport with its broad purpose of restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.  (Which may help explain why the Act’s express goal of completely 
eliminating all discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985 was not met.”)). 
30
 SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 143 (“Anticipating that industry and municipalities were likely to fight 
vigorous implementation of the CWA, Congress may have felt that the fishable-swimmable and ‘no discharge’ goals 
would provide a valuable counterweight.”).  Cf. DAVID M. DRIESEN & ROBERT W. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH 123 (2007) (“A charitable explanation is that Congress believes that it 
is important to establish long-term environmental aspirations, but realizes that economic, technological, and other 
factors must be considered in providing for short-term progress toward those goals.”). 
31
 The Senate report indicates that the Committee on Public Works regarded the no discharge goal as an important 
enforcement tool, but recognized that the impracticality of efforts to halt all pollution immediately required an 
exception for discharges covered by valid permits.  S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3668, 3709. 
32
 DRIESEN & ADLER, supra note 30, at 123 (arguing that Congress may consciously refuse to adopt specific 
provisions adequate to achieve statutory goals “for fear of alienating powerful constituents and other interest 
groups”).  Cf. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[A]s any student of the 
legislative process soon learns, it is one thing for Congress to announce a stated goal, and another for it to mandate 
full implementation of that goal.”). 
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task.33  The legislative history reveals that the key House and Senate committees were both fully 
aware that achievement of the no discharge goal would not occur, at least in the time frame 
spelled out in the statute.  Both committees recognized the difficulty of implementing a no-
discharge policy.34  Both intended that the no discharge goal serve as a kind of place holder, until 
a study that the law required the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of 
Engineering to conduct provided further information that Congress could use to determine the 
next step.  That information would “assist the Nation in any decision on the proper enforcement 
mechanism to be established to support the goal, if appropriate, or a decision to refine the date 
for the attainment of the goal with greater precision, if required, or the extent of the exceptions to 
that goal, if any, or whether the costs associated with reaching this ultimate standard, in some 
instances, may far outweigh the benefits derived.”35  In the interim, the no discharge goal would 
provide an impetus for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state environmental 
agencies, and industry to support research that would generate the technology needed to achieve 
acceptable levels of water quality.36 
2. Equilibrium vs. Dynamic Ecosystem Conceptions 
                                                 
33
 The CWA makes the discharge of any pollutant by any person unlawful, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006), but 
explicitly exempts from that prohibition discharges covered by a permit issued by either the Environmental 
Protection Agency or a state to which EPA has delegated its permit-issuing authority.  Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)-(b). 
34
 S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678.; H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at __ (1972). 
35
 S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678; see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at ___ (1972) 
(“At the conclusion of the study, with the appropriate information available, the Congress will be in a position to 
fully evaluate the implications of a no-discharge policy.”).  The requirement that states review and revise, as 
appropriate, their water quality standards at least once every three years beginning in 1972 also reflects the 
evolutionary nature of the statute.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (2006).  It should be noted that Congress retained the no 
discharge goal in § 101(a)(1) even after it amended the CWA in 1977 and 1987.  It may not have been politically 
feasible then to delete the highly visible no discharge goals, even though it was clear that they could not be 
achieved, and perhaps should not be legally enforceable.  The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit program, id. § 1342, together with the extended deadlines for compliance with the Act’s 
technology-based effluent limitations, made it clear that the no discharge goal was not the driving force behind day-
to-day implementation of the statute. 
36
 S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678.  The National Water Commission established by 
President Lyndon Johnson to study water quality problems took a different view, deeming the no discharge goal 
unfeasible, “destined to lead to public disappointment,” and reflective of the imputation of “an extravagant social 
value to an abstract concept of water purity.”  SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 142. 
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 The explanation for the appearance in the first section of the CWA of the goal of 
restoring and maintaining physical, chemical, and biological integrity is also contestable.  It is 
now well established that Congress adopted many of the core environmental statutes of the 1970s 
on the basis of the belief among most scientists and natural resource management policymakers 
that ecological systems tend toward a natural equilibrium.37  But the science of ecology has since 
experienced a “paradigm shift.”38  Instead of viewing natural systems as being in equilibrium or 
moving toward it, “[t]he contemporary paradigm recognizes that ecosystems are open and not 
necessarily in equilibrium.  It recognizes disturbances to be a natural part of ecosystems.”39  The 
prevailing current view also recognizes the inevitability of disturbance and the need for 
environmental management efforts to consider them, lest those efforts risk failing to preserve the 
resources in question in the long term.40 
 If congressional policymakers were guided by the equilibrium paradigm in drafting the 
CWA, the statue’s integrity goal would make sense.  Some scholars attribute the integrity goal to 
adherence to the then-prevailing equilibrium paradigm.41  Both the text and the legislative history 
are consistent with that premise, at least in part.  The statute defines pollution to mean “the man-
made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity 
of water.”42  The Senate committee explained that it added the definition to refine the concept of 
                                                 
37
 See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An 
Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 863-69 (1994) (discussing “equilibrium theory”).  
38
 Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 877 (1994). 
39
 Id. at 877. 
40
 Id. at 878-79. 
41
 See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 215 (2004) (contending that the CWA, 
reflected the prevailing notion “that nature was static and maintained an equilibrium or ‘balance.’  Pollution and 
excessive resource exploitation threatened the destruction of the fragile equilibrium underlying that balance, with 
potentially catastrophic consequences.”). 
42
 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2006).  Most of the CWA’s substantive provisions are tied to the discharge of “pollutants,” 
rather than to the occurrence of “pollution.”  See, e.g., id. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12).  “Pollutants” are defined by way of 
a list of examples, rather than by generic description.  Id. § 1362(6).  Some provisions refer to pollution, however.  
E.g., id. § 1251(b) (reciting a policy of preserving the primary right and responsibility of the states “to prevent, 
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water quality, as measured by the natural integrity of the resource.  Consistent with the 
equilibrium paradigm, the committee asserted that 
[m]aintenance of such integrity requires that any changes in the environment resulting in 
a physical, chemical or biological change in a pristine water body be of a temporary 
nature, such that by natural processes, within a few hours, days or weeks, the aquatic 
ecosystem will return to a state functionally identical to the original.43 
 
It added that the national policy concerning water bodies that are not pristine should be to take 
steps resulting in changes towards a pristine state in which physical, chemical, and biological 
integrity can be said to exist.  Restoration and maintenance of a pristine state would provide “a 
stable biosphere that is essential to the well-being of human society.”44  Likewise, the House 
committee reported that the term “integrity” was meant to refer “to a condition in which the 
natural structure and function of ecosystems is maintained.”45  A  
natural” ecosystem, in turn, generally meant one with conditions that existed “before the 
activities of man invoked perturbations which prevented the system from returning to its original 
state of equilibrium.”46  The Committee’s evocation of the equilibrium paradigm is 
unmistakable. 
 The legislative history also demonstrates, however, that legislators recognized that even 
ecosystems without people experience disturbances that alter their nature.  The House committee 
pointed out that “[e]cosystems themselves are dynamic, changing things.  They undergo their 
own evolutionary changes, and these are ‘natural’.”47  It also provided examples of “minor 
physical activities,” including “the perturbations caused by earthquakes, landslides, hurricanes, 
floods, volcanic activity, and the like,” that result in “changes [that] are part of the general order 
                                                                                                                                                             
reduce, and eliminate pollution”).  Moreover, the original name of the 1972 version of the CWA was the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. 
43
 S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742. 
44
 Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742. 
45
 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76-77(1972). 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. at __. 
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of things:  the natural law that has existed since the planet began to support life.”48  The 
Committee’s goal was to prohibit activities that “overtax” the ability of nature to adapt to these 
minor, natural perturbations.49  
 It is an oversimplification, therefore, to regard the equilibrium model as the underpinning 
for the CWA’s ecosystem integrity protection goal.  If the House Committee missed something 
important, it may have been in assuming that the time scale in which the CWA would operate 
would reflect “a relatively high degree of stability” in the absence of human intervention.50  The 
Committee recognized that evolutionary changes are “natural,” but counted those changes in 
terms of “geological” time.51  What the Committee seems to have underestimated is the degree to 
which ecosystems are engaged in a constant process of change, even in the absence of major, 
obvious natural or human disruptions, and that thoses changes can be measured in years or 
decades rather than just millennia.52 
  3. The Relationship Between Surface Water and Groundwater 
 When discussing the CWA’s goals and scope, this Article has referred to surface water.  
The intended distinction is between surface water and groundwater.  The CWA’s core provision 
− the prohibition on unpermitted pollutant discharges − applies to “navigable waters.”53  The Act 
then defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States.”54  That amorphous term has 
                                                 
48
 Id. at __. 
49
 Id. at 76-77. 
50
 Id. at __. 
51
 Id. at __. 
52
 Professor Adler’s contribution to this symposium argues that restoration of ecological health and resilience of the 
nation’s waters should be the focus of future CWA implementation.  The concept of resilience accepts that 
ecosystems are subject to change, but seeks to ensure that healthy natural systems have the capacity to resist radical 
changes that move them to entirely different states.  Robert W. Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and Sustainability, __ 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y __ (2009). 
53
 Section 301(a) of the CWA bars the discharge of a pollutant without or in violation of a permit.  33 U.S.C. § 
1311(a) (2006).  The statute defines “discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source.”  Id. § 1362(12)(A). 
54
 Id. § 1362(7).  The term also includes the territorial seas.  See also id. § 1362(8) (defining territorial seas). 
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given rise to a series of controversial questions whose resolution largely determines the statute’s 
scope.55  One of those is whether the discharge prohibition applies to groundwater pollution, or 
only discharges into surface water bodies.  The courts have reached inconsistent conclusions on 
this question.56  One recent district court decision concluded that the CWA “establishes that 
when Congress enacted the CWA, it decided not to attempt the general regulation of discharges 
to groundwater.”57  It added, however, that “the decision not to comprehensively regulate 
groundwater as part of the CWA does not require the conclusion that Congress intended to 
exempt groundwater from all regulation, particularly when the introduction of pollutants into the 
groundwater adversely affects adjoining river surface water.”58  The court therefore held “that 
the CWA extends federal jurisdiction over groundwater that is hydrologically connected to 
surface waters that are themselves waters of the United States.”59 
 If the courts that have found congressional intent to exclude or greatly limit coverage of 
groundwater have interpreted the statute correctly, one would expect to be able to discern a 
reason for treating surface and groundwater differently.  One possibility is that Congress 
regarded surface water and groundwater as separate resources and did not appreciate the 
existence of any relationship between the two.  The legislative history does not support that 
hypothesis, however.  The Senate Committee Report states explicitly that “[t]he Committee 
                                                 
55
 See, e.g., infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of the dredge and fill permit 
program to wetlands). 
56
 Compare Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1178-81 (holding that the CWA applies to 
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface water), with Umatilla Water Quality Protective Ass’n v. 
Smith Frozen Foods, 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (D. Or. 1997) (holding that the CWA does not apply to discharges 
into groundwater, even if the water is hydrologically connected to surface water).  A recent summary of the cases 
appears in Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (Puerto Rico), 599 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.P.R. 2009).  The court 
interpreted the cases as establishing that “’isolated /tributary groundwater,’ such as confined wells, has been 
unequivocally excluded from the Act,” id. at 179, but that there is a split of opinion on whether tributary 
groundwater which allegedly migrates from groundwater back into surface water is covered.  Id. at 180-81 (citing 
cases). 
57
 Hernandez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 181. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
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recognizes the essential link between ground and surface waters and the artificial nature of any 
distinction.”60  The committee warned that “[t]he importance of groundwater in the hydrological 
cycle cannot be underestimated.  Although only about 21.5 percent of our domestic, industrial 
agricultural supply comes directly from wells, it must be remembered that rivers, streams and 
lakes themselves are largely supplied with water from the ground − not surface runoff.”61  The 
Committee criticized existing regulatory programs that confined their coverage to surface water 
bodies and rejected the premise that the control of surface water pollution would assure 
acceptable groundwater quality.  Although the Committee did not regard groundwater pollution 
to be “as serious a national problem at present as is surface water pollution, . . . groundwater 
availability and quality is [sic] deteriorating.”62  It was concern over the growing threat to 
groundwater quality that prompted the Committee to support regulation of deep well disposal.63 
If Congress did not labor under the misimpression that groundwater could be safely 
ignored without impairing the CWA’s efforts to restore and maintain the integrity of aquatic 
ecosystems, why did it not clearly include discharges into groundwater within the scope of the 
Act’s general regulatory coverage?  One possibility is that it regarded the term “waters of the 
United States” as sufficiently broad to include groundwater, precluding the need for more 
detailed specification.  Some of the courts that found no coverage of groundwater have cited a 
portion of the Senate committee report, however, that referred to the “complex and varied” 
nature of state jurisdiction over groundwater.64  As indicated below,65 Congress was solicitous 
                                                 
60
 S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739. 
61
 Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739. 
62
 Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739. 
63
 See id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739.  The CWA requires each state that seeks permission to 
administer the NPDES permit program to demonstrate to EPA that its permit program provides adequate authority to 
control the disposal of pollutants into wells.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) (2006). 
64
 Umatilla Water Quality Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1997) 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.AN. 3668, 3749).  The district court in 
Umatilla also supported its conclusion that the CWA does not cover groundwater by noting the “new level of 
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and protective of state authority to control land and water development.66  A decision to avoid 
general coverage of groundwater discharges would be consistent with that deference to state 
authority if a sweeping regulatory program covering groundwater discharges would in effect 
require land use control, an area of traditional state regulatory jurisdiction.  In any event, it seems 
clear that Congress did not exclude groundwater discharges from the Act’s coverage as a result 
of a misperception that groundwater pollution plays no role in efforts to protect surface water 
quality or the integrity of aquatic ecosystems. 
  4. The Role of Nonpoint Source Pollution 
 A second jurisdictional issue is more easily resolved than the applicability of the CWA to 
groundwater.  The scope of the CWA’s regulatory provisions turns heavily on the distinction 
between point sources and nonpoint sources.  The Act’s core provision applies exclusively to the 
activities of point sources,67 which the statute defines broadly as “discernable, confined and 
                                                                                                                                                             
uncertainty and expense” that a contrary conclusion would add to the CWA permitting process and the possibility 
that groundwater coverage “would expose potentially hundreds of . . . permittees to current or future litigation and 
legal liability if they or [the state permitting agency] has happened to make the ‘wrong’ choice about which kind of 
permit discharges to groundwater require.”  Id. at 1320.  These “practical consequences” are of course irrelevant 
except to the extent they shed light on congressional intent on the question of groundwater coverage. 
65
 See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
66
 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b), (g) (2006). 
67
 Again, § 301(a) bars the unpermitted discharge of a pollutant.  Id. § 1311(a).  The Act defines the “discharge of a 
pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”  Id. § 1362(12)(A).  
Consequently, the addition of pollutants to navigable waters from nonpoint sources do not qualify as discharges of 
pollutants.  See also Friends of the Everglades v. South-Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 2009 WL 1545551, at *15 (11th 
Cir. June 4, 2009) (“Non-point source pollution, chiefly runoff, is widely recognized as a serious water quality 
problem, but the NPDES program does not even address it.”).  Cf. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 143 
(“Congress’ principal goal in passing the CWA was to reduce discharges from point sources.”).  Environmental 
advocates have pressed for a more expansive application of the CWA’s scope to encompass nonpoint sources.  See 
Kristi Johnson, Note, The Mythical Giant, Clean Water Act Section 401 and Nonpoint Source Pollution, 29 ENVTL. 
L. 417, 418 (1999) (discussing efforts by environmentalist groups to use § 401 of the CWA to regulate nonpoint 
sources).  But the courts have refused to interpret the statute broadly to encompass nonpoint sources.  See Defenders 
of Wildlife v. EPA, 415 F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the CWA does not require states to take 
regulatory action to limit the amount of non-point water pollution introduced into its waterways”); Pronsolino v. 
Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding EPA can regulate nonpoint source pollution using total maximum 
daily loads, but that implementation remains the responsibility of the states); Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. 
Supp. 2d 1150, 1161 (D. Colo. 2000) (holding that states retain option, but are not required, to regulate nonpoint 
sources because Congress recognizes the difficulty of isolating responsible polluters), aff'd, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
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discrete conveyances.”68  The technology-based effluent limitations, the Act’s first line of 
defense against harmful pollution,69 also apply only to point sources.70  The few provisions of the 
statute that apply to nonpoint sources71 do not create authority for the establishment of federally 
enforceable discharge limits.72  Instead, control of nonpoint sources is left almost entirely to state 
discretion.73 
 Why did Congress draw such a distinct and significant line between point sources, which 
would be extensively regulated, and nonpoint sources, whose control would remain within the 
discretion of the states?  One possibility is that those who drafted the CWA were unaware of the 
scope of nonpoint source pollution or the degree to which it would affect efforts to restore and 
maintain ecosystem integrity.74  The CWA’s legislative history, however, does not support the 
notion that legislators were blithely unaware that nonpoint source pollution was a significant 
contributor to the burden of surface water pollution that the CWA was designed to check.  A 
House committee report refers to “extensive testimony” during oversight hearings  
“that nonpoint sources of pollutants could and would, in many cases, preclude the meeting of 
                                                 
68
 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006).  The statute specifically excludes agricultural stormwater discharges and return 
flows from irrigated agriculture from the definition of a point source.  Id. 
69
 See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
70
 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2006) (describing effluent limitations for point sources, or for categories and classes of point 
sources).  The CWA also authorizes regulation of indirect dischargers, also known as industrial users.  These are 
industrial sources of pollution that send their waste for treatment by publicly owned treatment works instead of 
discharging them directly into waters of the United States.  See id. §§ 1314(g), 1317(b) (authorizing the adoption of 
pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers). 
71
 The CWA does not even define a nonpoint source.  It is therefore defined by process of exclusion.  If a source of 
surface water pollution is not a point source, it must be a nonpoint source.  For examples of nonpoint sources, see id. 
§ 1314(f). 
72
 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 651, 662 (2004) (“The 
provisions of the CWA that require control over the addition of pollutants by nonpoint sources are also simple. 
There, basically, are not any.”). 
73
 See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 153 (“The CWA effectively leaves the regulation of nonpoint 
pollution up to the individual states.”). 
74
 Cf. Rose, supra note 21, at 283-84 (noting that “[s]ome major polluters can be located easily, particularly those 
polluters already classed as point sources . . . .  But many discharges cannot be located easily, and hence they may 
be overlooked entirely in regulatory systems for water pollution control.  Many discharges come from run-off, i.e., 
the so-called nonpoint pollutants: sediment from construction, organic materials, pesticides from farms, and 
fertilizers from lawns.”). 
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water quality standards. . . .  The Committee clearly recognizes that non-point sources of 
pollution are a major contributor to water quality problems.”75 
 Rather, the decision to essentially exclude nonpoint sources from mandatory federal 
regulation stemmed from two other assumptions, one technical and the other political.  The first 
was that the means of controlling (and measuring)76 nonpoint source pollution were not as 
readily available as those for point source pollution, thus making control of nonpoint source 
pollution a much tougher nut to crack.77  The second was that the diffuse nature of nonpoint 
source control, which does not emanate from an easily identified and convenient pipe or other 
conveyance upon which to slap technological controls, essentially requires the use of best 
management practices (BMPs) rather than end-of-pipe technological fixes.  Enforceable BMPs, 
in turn, are tantamount to land use controls.  Because many legislators were committed to 
protecting the sovereignty of state and local governments to control land use, nonpoint source 
pollution seemed to extend federal regulation too far, even if the newly authorized federal 
technology-based controls for point sources did not.78 
                                                 
75
 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 911 (1972).  See also S. REP. 92-414 (19771), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 
3705.   Professor Hines noted in 1966 that “agriculture has joined the cities and industries as a major source of 
pollution.”  Hines I, supra note 1, at 193. 
76
 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 21, at 279 (“The end of the pipe, or ‘point source’ as it was called, was the place where 
pollution control performance could be measured easily.”).   
77
 William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today − Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 U. ALA. L. REV. 537, 
562 (2004) [hereinafter Andreen, Water Quality Today], makes the point as follows: 
Not only would there be fewer and more obvious candidates for regulation, but point source discharges 
were amenable to end-of-pipe treatment, whereas the control of non-point source pollution was often 
thought impractical and not properly subject to federal direction.  What was the EPA supposed to do, tell 
farmers how to farm? 
See also Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 616 (2008) (“It is difficult, 
although in at least some cases not impossible, to directly monitor discharges from non-point sources.  Therefore, 
setting and enforcing discharge limitations on non-point sources of the sort typically applied to point sources, which 
require monitoring at the point of discharge, remains problematic.”). 
78
 See Cannon, supra note 77, at 616 (“The 1972 Congress may also have been influenced by the view that control 
of non-point source pollution is a form of land use control and that land use control rests traditionally with state and 
local governments, not with the federal government.”).  In fact, there is still no federal land use planning in the 
United States.  Jonathan H. Adler, Once More with Feeling:  Reaffirming the Limits of the Clean Water Act 
Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS ON RAPANOS 82 (K. Wroth ed., Vt. 
Envtl. L.J. and VLS, 2007). 
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Further, the decision to exclude nonpoint sources from mandatory federal regulation in 
1972 was consistent with the notion that the CWA as it was adopted at that time was an 
experiment, whose impact and sufficiency would be reassessed as implementation proceeded.79  
To facilitate that evaluation process, Congress chose to require that EPA adopt guidelines to 
assist state pollution control agencies in identifying and evaluating the nature and extent of 
nonpoint source pollution and available processes and methods of controlling it.80  The House 
committee report warned that “[i]f our water pollution problems are truly to be solved, we are 
going to have to vigorously address the problems of nonpoint sources.”81  For that reason, the 
information-gathering provision concerning nonpoint sources was “among the most important in 
the 1972 Amendments.”82 
  5. The Role of Wetlands in Aquatic Ecosystems 
 Yet another crucial coverage question concerns the applicability of the CWA to wetlands.  
The importance of wetlands to aquatic ecosystems is beyond question.83  Among other things, 
they filter out pollutants and purify and recharge groundwater, provide protection against storm 
surges in coastal areas, provide erosion protection, reduce flood damage, provide fish and 
wildlife habitat, and even mitigate global warming.84  The 1972 CWA included a program which 
                                                 
79
 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (explaining why Congress was willing to adopt an unrealistic no 
discharge goal). 
80
 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (2006). 
81
 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at __ (1972). 
82
 Id. at __. 
83
 See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 41, at 72 (stating that “aquatic wetland areas that constitute the border between 
land and water are . . . invariably of great ecological value (and fragility)”).  The value of wetlands was not always 
appreciated, as the federal government previously viewed them as obstacles to progress and enacted policies 
attempting to eliminate them.  Jonathan H. Adler, Swamp Rules: The End of Federal Wetland Regulation?, 22 
REGULATION 11, available athttp://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv22n2/swamprules.pdf [hereinafter Adler, 
Swamp Rules]. 
84
 See Oliver A. Houck, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act 
Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 52 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1244-45 (1995) [hereinafter Houck, 
Wetlands Regulation]; Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: Am Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global 
Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1200-01 (2007); Marc C. Hebert, Coastal Restoration Under CWPPRA and 
Property Rights Issues, 57 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1169-70 (1997).  Recognizing the importance of wetlands, some states 
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has been used to control wetlands development − the section 404 dredge and fill permit 
program85 − even though the statute does not use the term wetlands.86  Judicial interpretations of 
the scope of the program have exacerbated rather than resolved the resulting confusion.87  The 
dredge and fill permit program apparently was designed to both protect wetlands and allow 
development of economically valuable properties with access to water.88  It failed, however, to 
enunciate a clear policy to guide the responsible agencies in striking that balance.89  Given the 
ecosystem services  that wetlands provide, their preservation is consistent with and vital to the 
statutory goals of restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
                                                                                                                                                             
began enacting wetland protection statutes in the 1960s, before federal regulation began.  See, e.g., Adler, Swamp 
Rules, supra note 83, at 11.  By the time federal regulation had begun in the mid-1970s, eleven inland states and 
every coastal state (except Texas), had wetland protections in place.   COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT OVERVIEW at 56 (citing Robert Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restoration and Creation 
of Wetlands, 34 NATURAL RESOURCES J.781, 788-89 (1994)). 
85
 Section 404(a) allows the Secretary of the Army, through the Army Corps of Engineers, to issue permits for the 
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).  Because the term 
pollutant includes materials such as dredged spoil, rock, and sand, id. § 1362(6), the discharge of dredged or fill 
material without such a permit would violate § 301(a)’s prohibition on unpermitted discharges.  Id. § 1311(a). 
86
 See William L. Andreen & Shana Campbell Jones, The Clean Water Act: A Blueprint for Reform 38 (Center for 
Progressive Reform White Paper #802, July 2008), available at 
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/whitePapers.cfm.  The 1972 statute did not refer directly to “wetlands” or 
“tributaries,” despite language defining the jurisdictional reach of § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and the direct 
reference to “wetlands” in the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.  ECOLOGY OF FRESHWATER AND ESTUARINE 
WETLANDS 323 (Darold P. Batzer & Rebecca R. Sharitz eds., University of Cal. Press, 2006).  The Corps of 
Engineers’ § 404 regulations initially did not cover discharges to wetlands, but the Corps amended those regulations 
to do so after the courts interpreted the scope of statutory coverage broadly.  See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (ordering the agency to issue “regulations clearly 
recognizing the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act”); Augusta Wilson, Note, Of Ponds and Pot: How 
Rapanos Ignored Raich and the Potential Role for Cooperative Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453, 
462 (2008) (explaining that, in response to the decision in Callaway, the Corps expanded its definition of “navigable 
waters” to include “(1) tributaries of navigable waters; (2) interstate waters and their tributaries; (3) non-navigable 
intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce, and; (4) all freshwater wetlands that were 
adjacent to waters covered under the Act”). 
87
 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); United States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. 
Ala. 2007) (scathing denunciation of both Rapanos and the 11th Circuit’s interpretation of it), reh'g en banc denied, 
521 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 630 (2008). 
88
 LAZARUS, supra note 41, at 72. 
89
 EPA has the authority to veto dredge and fill permits issued by the Corps of Engineers, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(j) 
(2006), although EPA rarely exercises that veto power.  See Lance D. Wood, Section 404: Federal Wetlands 
Regulation Is Essential, 7-Summer NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 7, 55 (1992); Katharine J. Teter, Robert C. Widner & 
Carol Deck, Long Arm of Uncle Sam: Federal Environmental Issues in Siting Decisions, 7-Winter NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 9, 9 (1993). 
Glicksman & Batzel Page 20 12/28/2009 
C:\Word\articles\CWA assumptions # 14.doc 
the nation’s waters.90  But as Alyson Flournoy has noted, “[o]ne turns to the statute for adequate 
direction on its purposes in vain. . . .  [S]ection 404 is . . . a statute whose most frequently cited 
mission is to protect wetlands but which fails to mention wetlands.  In section 404, Congress left 
key questions not only unanswered but unasked.”91  As a result, the scientific and technical 
assumptions upon which Congress rested its creation of the dredge and fill permit program are 
shrouded in uncertainty. 
6. Technology-Based vs. Water Quality-Based Controls 
 A final technical assumption that shaped the 1972 CWA is based on the history of pre-
1972 federal water pollution control legislation.  The CWA, unlike the Clean Air Act adopted in 
1970, relies as its first line of defense against pollution on technology-based discharge controls, 
rather than the achievement of ambient quality standards.92  This choice flowed directly from the 
lessons legislators drew from experience with the pre-1972 legislation.  That experience made it 
clear that available scientific knowledge was not adequate to identify cause-and-effect 
relationships between particular discharges and ambient water quality problems.93  The inability 
to make those causal links hampered federal and state policymakers both in selecting the effluent 
                                                 
90
 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
91
 Alyson C. Flournoy, Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A Program in Search of a Policy, 55 ALA. L. REV. 607, 
615-16 (2004). 
92
 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2006) (requiring compliance by point sources with technology-based effluent 
limitations), with 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006) (authorizing EPA to adopt national ambient air quality standards).  See 
also SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 144 (explaining that “the CWA reverses the approach of the CAA.  
Instead of setting ambient water concentrations and working backwards to determine individual emission levels, the 
CWA starts with individual effluent levels.”); LAZARUS, supra note 41, at 177 (stating that technology-based 
standards were the CWA’s “first order or business”).  The Clean Air Act also contains performance standards, 
including the standards of performance that apply to new stationary sources, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006), and the 
nationally uniform standards for controlling motor vehicle emissions.  Id. § 7421(a).  These standards of 
performance provide some protection in the event that state implementation plans fail to achieve the national 
ambient air quality standards by the designated statutory deadlines. 
93
 See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States − State, Local, and 
Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 158 (2003) [hereinafter Andreen, Evolution I] 
(arguing that a shift away from an ambient quality-based approach “was crucial if water pollution was actually going 
to be tackled effectively within a reasonably prompt period of time since the implementation of water quality 
standards was fraught with so many technical and policy problems.”). 
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limitations to impose on individual dischargers and in demonstrating for enforcement purposes 
that particular dischargers had caused violations of state water quality standards.94  The Senate 
committee report found that state environmental officials were still trying to establish 
relationships between pollutants and uses of receiving waters because of 
the great difficulty associated with establishing reliable and enforceable precise effluent 
limitations on the basis of a given stream quality.  Water quality standards, in addition to 
their deficiencies in relying on the assimilative capacity of receiving waters, often cannot 
be translated into effluent limitations − defendable in court tests, because of the 
imprecision of models for water quality and the effects of effluents in most waters. 
 
Under this Act the basis of pollution prevention and elimination will be the 
application of effluent limitations.  Water quality will be a measure of program 
effectiveness and performance, not a means of elimination and enforcement. 
 
The Committee recommends the change to effluent limits as the best available 
mechanism to control water pollution. With effluent limits, the Administrator can require 
the best control technology; he need not search for a precise link between pollution and 
water quality.95 
 
The decision to achieve the CWA’s goals primarily through the adoption and 
enforcement of technology-based effluent limitations that Congress directed EPA to develop and 
apply to point sources was thus a product of necessity.  That decision emerged from the technical 
difficulties, revealed through experience with the pre-1972 laws, in translating water quality 
standards into enforceable effluent limitations for individual dischargers.  The switch to a 
technology-based approach would facilitate enforcement by “mak[ing] it unnecessary to work 
backward from an overpolluted body of water to determine which point sources are responsible 
                                                 
94
 See LAZARUS, supra note 41, at 72 (noting that “Congress deliberately decided against having water quality 
standards be the primary basis for pollution control because of the sheer complexity of determining cause and effect 
of pollutants in aquatic systems” and that pre-1972 experience indicated that regulation tied to cause-and effect 
relationships between particular discharges and impacts on receiving water quality “would quickly become mired in 
protracted factfinding and scientific uncertainty”); SALZMAN AND THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 143-44 (stating that 
“the problems that arose in implementing the 1965 Water Quality Act . . . convinced Congress that the states would 
find it difficult to translate water quality standards into numeric effluent limitations for individual point sources”). 
95
 S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675. 
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and which must be abated.”96  The focus on technology-based controls was therefore pragmatic.  
In choosing to force point sources to reduce discharges to the extent it was technologically and 
economically feasible to do so, Congress essentially concluded that compliance with technology-
based controls would serve as a pragmatic surrogate for achieving the levels of discharge 
reductions needed to secure the Act’s fishable-swimmable waters goal as quickly as possible.  
But the focus on technology-based controls also appears to have reflected a moral judgment that 
polluters should be forced to reduce their discharges to the maximum amount that technology 
allowed.97 
B. Political and Social Policy Assumptions 
 As the discussion in the previous section indicates, the CWA of 1972 was largely shaped 
by a series of scientific and technical assumptions that Congress made that affected the 
objectives, scope, and nature of the new legislation.  That discussion also makes it clear that 
Congress grappled with more than just technical considerations.  The CWA was the product of a 
series of contestable political and social policy assumptions, too.98  This section explores 
additional assumptions of this kind, including those that determined the allocation of authority to 
                                                 
96
 EPA v. Calif. ex rel. Water Res. Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204 (1976).  See also Andreen, Evolution II, supra note 24, at 
270 (“One of the main reasons to create a system in which polluters would be assigned precise, technology-based 
permit limitations was to make the statute more easily enforceable.  No longer would the Act limit enforcement to 
instances in which public health or welfare was endangered or where the government could show proof that a 
particular discharge had caused a particular violation of water quality standards.”); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds, 
and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 417-18 (1994) [hereinafter Houck, 
Bats] (arguing that “best available technology side-stepped the age-old and irresolvable arguments of whether 
‘significant’ harm existed and who was ‘causing’ it and began to abate the pollution itself”). 
97
 See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 
533, 554 n.64 (2007) (discussing approach to controlling pollution that is based on “a moral imperative that 
industries must reduce pollution as much as possible”); see also Andreen, Evolution II, supra note 24, at 266 
(asserting that the Senate Public Works Committee’s decision to move to a technology-based approach was in part 
philosophical, premised on the idea that polluters no longer had the right to pollute or to rely on the assimilative 
capacity of receiving waters).  The adoption of nationally uniform, technology based controls also reflects “a moral 
argument that environmental risk exposure is involuntary and thus protection levels should be the same for all 
citizens, regardless of the cost of achieving them, and perhaps even higher for vulnerable populations.  This 
argument is one of the fundamental principles of the environmental justice movement.”  A Dan Tarlock, Safe 
Drinking Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 250 (1997). 
98
 See, e.g., supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s unwillingness to require mandatory 
controls for nonpoint sources to avoid infringing on state and local regulatory prerogatives). 
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control water pollution between EPA and the states and the respective roles of government and 
the public in overseeing implementation and enforcement of the statute’s requirements. 
  1. Cooperative Federalism 
 Five years before Congress adopted the CWA, Professor Hines identified “the central 
problem raised by substantial federal involvement in water quality control−accomplishing 
national objectives of restoring water quality while maintaining appropriate respect for local 
institutions.”99  Most of the pollution control statutes that Congress adopted during the 1970s, 
including the CWA, reflected a legislative commitment to the model of cooperative federalism, 
which involves “shared governmental responsibilities for regulating private activity.”100  That 
commitment is clearly enunciated in the statutory policy declaration 
to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to 
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including 
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult 
with the Administrator [of EPA] in the exercise of his authority under [the CWA].”101 
 
In addition, Congress declared a policy that state authority to allocate water quantities not be 
superseded, abrogated, or impaired by the enactment of the CWA.102 
 Although the effort to improve and protect water quality was to be a cooperative one, 
there is no question that Congress sought to significantly increase the federal government’s 
                                                 
99
 Hines III, supra note 1, at 799.  See also id. at 800 (arguing that “reconciliation of the continually expanding 
federal involvement in water quality management with the policy of local program primacy has become increasingly 
difficult over the last decade”); id. at 859 (“Over the years, the most vexing issue raised by the activities of the 
federal government to improve water quality has been the proper relationship between local and federal water 
pollution abatement problems.  Each attempt to broaden the federal involvement in water quality control has met 
with spirited resistance premised on the primacy of state rights in the pollution control field.”). 
100
 Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental 
Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737 (2006) (quoting 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS AND ROBERT L. 
GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 5:3 (2d ed. 2007)).  The article explores in depth the roots, aims, 
and fate of cooperative federalism in federal environmental legislation.  Federalism issues can be traced back to the 
Constitution treating the states as sovereigns that are distinct from the federal government. Id.  
101
 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006). 
102
 Id. § 1251(g). 
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role.103  Before 1972, Congress had relied on the states to “lead the national effort to prevent, 
control and abate water pollution,” with the federal government’s role being limited to one of 
supporting and assisting the states.104  The new legislation would attempt to “restore the balance 
of Federal-State effort” by, among other things establishing “a direct link between the Federal 
government and each industrial source of discharge into the navigable waters” through EPA’s 
promulgation of nationally applicable, technology-based effluent limitations.105  Some believe 
that the impetus for heightening the federal role was “the overriding perception that water quality 
was not improving, and that the states could not be depended on to improve the situation.”106  
The effect was to “nationalize[ ] the business of water pollution control in the United States, 
relegating the states, whose authority had long dominated the area, to a largely secondary, 
supporting role.”107 
                                                 
103
 The U.S. Supreme Court has even called this approach “taking a stick to the states.”  Train v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975) 
104
 S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669. 
105
 Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669.  Professor Hines stated in 1967 that although policymakers long 
assumed that local control was the most efficient means of dealing with water quality problems, “[o]ver time, as the 
pollution problem has steadily worsened, the wisdom of this judgment increasingly has been called in question.”  
Hines III, supra note 1, at 800. 
106
 See e.g., Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997).  Others have noted that during the 1950s and 1960s, “state and local 
governments began to recognize the importance of environmental quality and adopted first generation environmental 
controls.”   Adler, Fable, supra note 23, at 96.  By 1966, every state had adopted some sort of water pollution 
legislation. Id.  Professor Adler contends that the “conventional fable is that federal environmental regulation was 
necessary because states failed to adopt adequate environmental measures,” and that this perspective “ignores the 
substantial environmental progress in many areas prior to the enactment of most major federal environmental laws.”  
Id.  But see supra note 21. 
Congress also relegated the Corps of Engineers, which had been responsible for administering the Refuse 
Act of 1899’s permit program, to a supporting rather than a starring role under the CWA.  The House report 
professed “the highest regard for the integrity and abilities of the Corps,” but stated that the President and Congress 
agreed when EPA was created “that it would be the single agency responsible for leading the battle against 
pollution.   Although other agencies such as the Corps have a tremendous role to play in this battle, it must be a 
supportive role.   The administration of the extremely important [NPDES] permit program is not a supportive role.  
Indeed, this permit program as envisioned by the Committee may well be the most important facet of the new water 
pollution control program.”  H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at __ (1972).  Accordingly, EPA, not the Corps, would supervise 
the NPDES permit program.  The Corps remained responsible for issuing dredge and fill permits in the first 
instance, but subject to EPA veto.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(j) (2006). 
107
 Andreen, Water Quality Today, supra note 77, at 537. 
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 Even though the partnership between EPA and the states was by no means an equal one, 
the states retained important authority and discretion.108  First, Congress afforded each state the 
option of applying to EPA for permission to administer the NPDES permit program for point 
sources located within its jurisdiction.  If a state permit program meets CWA requirements, EPA 
is obliged to approve it and withdraw from issuing NPDES permits in that state.109  Second, the 
Act preserves not only the authority and jurisdiction of the states to control water quantity 
allocation,110 but also the authority to adopt discharge controls for point sources that are more 
stringent than those adopted by EPA.111  Consequently, EPA’s technology-based controls are 
floor, not ceiling preemptive.112  The House Committee responsible for adoption of the 1972 
CWA noted the “extreme importance in assuring the States of the right to adopt or enforce 
provisions at least as strict as those established in this legislation.”113 
                                                 
108
 Despite this authority, Congress built several safeguards into the Act to deal with the possibility that states would 
not perform up to its expectations.  As indicated below, for example, EPA retained the authority to veto individual 
state permits.  42 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (2006).  Congress also authorized EPA to suspend or withdraw approval for 
state NPDES permit programs if a state fails to administer the program in accordance with its CWA responsibilities.  
Id. § 1342(c).  Further, as indicated below, Congress subjected state water quality standards to veto by EPA and 
vested the federal agency with the power to promulgate standards for a state whose standards are not consistent with 
the CWA or if EPA determines that a federal standard is necessary to meet the requirements of the CWA.  Id. § 
1313(c)(4). 
109
 Id. § 1342(b).  EPA retains the authority to veto individual state permits if it finds them to be “outside the 
guidelines and requirements” of the CWA.  Id. § 1342(d)(2).  Congress also sought to allocate authority to issue 
(and veto) dredge and fill permits.  See § 1344(g)-(j); H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at ___ (1972) (“The Committee 
believes that the States ought to have the opportunity to assume the responsibilities that they have requested.  If, 
however, a State fails to carry out its obligations and misuses the permit program, the Administrator is fully 
authorized . . . to withdraw his approval of a State program.”). 
110
 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), (g), 1370(2) (2006). 
111
 Id. § 1370(1).  The Act also preserves state power to address water pollution through common law remedies.  Id. 
§ 1365(e). 
112
 For discussion of the distinction between floor preemption (which precludes displacement of federal standards by 
weaker state standards) and ceiling preemption (which precludes displacement of federal standards by more 
stringent state standards), see Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling 
Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 N.W. U. L. REV. 579, 
583 (2008). 
113
 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at ___ (1972). 
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Third, Congress vested in the states the responsibility to adopt water quality standards 
(subject to EPA veto),114 despite the failure of the pre-1972 legislation that relied on a water 
quality-based approach to controlling water pollution.  This time, however, water quality 
standards did not represent the sole or even the first line of defense against water pollution.  
Instead, the state water quality standards would serve as safety nets in case EPA’s technology-
based effluent limitations failed to provide an acceptable level of water quality.115  Once the 
water quality standards were in place, point sources would be obliged to comply with any 
effluent limitations more stringent than applicable technology-based controls to the extent 
necessary to assure compliance with the water quality standards.116 
Fourth, as discussed above,117 water allocation and quantity remained the prerogatives of 
the states.  Finally, Congress’s failure to mandate control for nonpoint sources essentially left it 
up to the states to determine whether to control runoff from those sources and, if so, how to do 
so.  Congress chose to steer clear of significant federal involvement in both of these areas 
because of its desire to avoid intruding on the exercise of traditional state police power 
prerogatives in applying land use controls and administering allocative water law.118 
2. Supplemental Citizen Enforcement 
                                                 
114
 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006). 
115
 The House Committee explained the function of state water quality standards as follows: 
Even though section 301(b)(1) (A) and (B) requires the setting of effluent limitations consistent with best 
practicable control technology currently available, the Committee intends that if the sum of the discharges 
from point sources meeting such effluent limitations would preclude the meeting of water quality standards 
in existence on the date of enactment of the 1972 Amendments, or those promulgated pursuant to section 
303, new and more stringent effluent limitations would have to be established consistent with such water 
quality standards. 
H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at ___ (1972).  See also id. at ___ (“Water quality standards will be utilized for the purpose 
of setting effluent limitations in those cases where effluent limitations for point sources would not be consistent with 
such standards.”). 
116
 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2006). 
117
 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
118
 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (stating policy to preserve state rights to plan the development and use of 
water resources). 
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 One of the glaring deficiencies of the pre-1972 water pollution control legislation was the 
weakness of its enforcement mechanism.119  Congress set out to strengthen the enforcement 
process by, among other things, providing concurrent enforcement authority in EPA and the 
states.120  In addition, it crafted a citizen suit provision, which enables individuals and public 
interest groups to sue either point sources alleged to be in violation of their regulatory 
obligations or EPA if it fails to perform a nondiscretionary duty.121  Citizen suits provide a safety 
valve in the event that federal and state regulators fail to enforce the law vigorously, whether as a 
result of cooptation by regulated entities122 or funding or personnel deficiencies.123  
The House report explained that it intended plaintiffs in citizen suits to act as “private 
attorneys general” and that the citizen suit provision would “provide[ ] an open door for those 
                                                 
119
 See William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the Clean Water Act, 24 PACE 
ENVTL. L.J. 67, 68 (2007) [hereinafter Andreen, Institutional Culture] (“The pre-1972 federal water pollution 
control program had languished for years due to spotty and ineffectual efforts to exact compliance with its water 
quality objectives.  Thoroughly disenchanted with that pattern of impotence, Congress set out to cure the problem, 
not only by establishing an enforceable pollution control strategy, but also by strengthening the enforcement process 
itself.”). 
120
 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006). 
121
 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).  For discussion of the impact of citizen suits under federal environmental legislation to 
force agencies to perform nondiscretionary duties, see Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen 
Suits to Enforce Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353 (2004) [hereinafter Glicksman, Agency-
Forcing]. 
122
 See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen 
Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 81 (2002); Glicksman, Agency Forcing, supra note 121, at 383-85; see also Andreen, 
Evolution II, supra note 24, at 286 (asserting that the CWA’s citizen suit provision is one of several in the statute 
that reflect “Congress’ skepticism about EPA’s ability or even the willingness of EPA or any expert administrative 
agency to continuously and vigorously perform its regulatory mission”). 
123
 See Andreen & Jones, supra note 86, at 44 (citing reports that from 1997 to 2007 “enforcement funding to EPA 
regions decreased 8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms, and regional officials report that they reduced the number of 
enforcement staff by about 5 percent to address funding shortages.”).  Cf. James R. May, Now More than Ever: 
Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that the Clean Air Act’s 
citizen suit provision, adopted in 1970, was “borne in a fulcrum of necessity due to inadequate resources and 
resolve”).  Professor May finds citizen suits under the environmental statutes generally to have been a resounding 
success: 
Citizens suits work; they have transformed the environmental movement, and with it, society.  
Citizen suits have secured compliance by myriad agencies and thousands of polluting facilities [and] 
diminished pounds of pollution produced by the billions . . . .The foregone monetary value of citizen 
enforcement has conserved innumerable agency resources and saved taxpayers billions. 
Id. at 3-4.  Professor May’s article compares the number of EPA referrals to the Department of Justice for civil 
enforcement compared to citizen suits under the CWA for the period 1995-2002, and the numbers of consent 
decrees reached in government enforcement actions and citizen suits for the period 1995-2001.  Id. at 42-43.  He 
concludes that citizen suits generally, which are filed at the rate of at least once a week, “help advance the rule of 
law and keep agencies honest.”  Id. at 47. 
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who have legitimate interests in the courts, and encourages more meaningful participation in the 
administrative processes.”124  The Senate report added that plaintiffs in citizen suits would 
perform “a public service,” and that it authorized courts to award litigation costs125 to prevailing 
plaintiffs in recognition of that role.126 
 C. Legal Assumptions 
 One final key assumption that Congress relied on in adopting the 1972 CWA concerned 
the scope of its authority to regulate the activities responsible for causing impaired water quality.  
The core provision of the CWA prohibits the unpermitted discharge of pollutants.127  The Act 
defines such a discharge as the addition of pollutants to “navigable waters” from any point 
source.128  As the discussion above indicates, judicial treatment, especially at the Supreme Court, 
of the statutory term “navigable waters” has engendered chaos.  Although the Court has never 
invalidated the CWA, or held that its application to a particular discharge is unconstitutional, it 
has relied on concerns that the Act’s application to intrastate waters and isolated wetlands might 
exceed the bounds of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause129 as a justification for 
interpreting the scope of the dredge and fill permit program narrowly.130 
 The CWA’s drafters seemed to have had no concern that the anticipated broad coverage 
of the Act’s discharge prohibitions and permit programs might run afoul of any limits on federal 
                                                 
124
 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at ___ (1972).  See also May, supra note 123, at 6-7 (describing how citizen suits enhance 
public participation). 
125
 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006) (authorizing courts in citizen suits to award litigation costs, including attorneys 
fees, to prevailing or substantially prevailing parties when a court determines that it is appropriate to do so). 
126
 See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747. 
127
 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
128
 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2006). 
129
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
130
 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion) (stating that the Corps’ interpretation 
of “navigable waters” “stretches the outer limits of Congress'’ commerce power and raises difficult questions about 
the ultimate scope of that power”); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (identifying “significant constitutional questions” in broad interpretation of the scope 
of the dredge and fill permit program).  Some lower courts have gone further. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 133 
F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997) (invalidating Corps’ regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” to the extent 
that it authorized regulation of intrastate, nonnavigable waters “which could affect interstate commerce”). 
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regulatory power derived from the Commerce Clause.  The House report, with considerable 
prescience, expressed reluctance about using the term “navigable waters” lest it be interpreted 
narrowly by the courts.  The Committee stated: 
One term that the Committee was reluctant to define was the term “navigable waters.”  
The reluctance was based on the fear that any interpretation would be read narrowly. 
However, this is not the Committee’s intent.  The Committee fully intends that the term 
“navigable waters” be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation 
unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made for 
administrative purposes.131 
 
Similarly, a Senate report explained that the Act was consciously drafted to avoid the narrow 
interpretations of the scope of regulatory jurisdiction that had helped thwart implementation of 
the 1965 Water Quality Act.132  According to the report, such broad applicability was necessary 
to achieve the statute’s goals because “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that 
discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.   Therefore, reference to the control 
requirements must be made to the navigable waters, portions thereof, and their tributaries.”133  
The conference committee confirmed the intent to afford the term “navigable waters” “the 
broadest possible constitutional interpretation.”134 
 The legislative record does not appear to  provide any basis for believing that legislators 
doubted the adequacy of congressional power to cover all relevant portions of the hydrological 
cycle (at least with respect to surface waters).135  The concern was that courts might interpret the 
scope of the statute more narrowly than Congress intended, not that the courts would find that 
the intended scope outstripped delegated legislative authority under the Constitution.  But the 
                                                 
131
 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at ___ (1972). 
132
 S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972). 
133
 S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742-43. 
134
 S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972). 
135
 But cf Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731-32 (2006) (plurality opinion) (noting that “the CWA 
authorizes federal jurisdiction only over ‘waters,’” and that “[t]he only natural definition of the term ‘waters,’ our 
prior and subsequent judicial constructions of it, clear evidence from other provisions of the statute, and this Court’s 
canons of construction all confirm that ‘the waters of the United States’ in § 1362(7) cannot bear the expansive 
meaning that the Corps would give it” in extending it to certain wetlands adjacent to traditionally navigable waters). 
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Supreme Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison later raised doubts about the limits of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause that did not exist when Congress adopted the 
CWA in 1972.136  Those newly enunciated limits eventually prompted the Court to interpret the 
intended scope of the CWA narrowly to avoid raising constitutional federalism questions. 
 
IV. THE REALITY OF CWA IMPLEMENTATION 
 Congress based its quest “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters”137 on the premises discussed in part III above.  More than three 
and-a-half decades later, pollutant discharges have not been eliminated and not all surface water 
bodies have achieved fishable-swimmable status.  Nevertheless, significant progress toward 
these goals has been made.  This part briefly assesses the impact of the CWA on surface water 
pollution and aquatic ecosystems and assesses what light the Act’s fate sheds on the initial 
assumptions. 
 A. The CWA’s Impact on Pollution and Wetlands Protection 
 By all accounts, the CWA has made significant inroads into the nation’s water pollution 
problems.  EPA reported in 2002 that the statute’s technology-based effluent limitations, as 
applied to point sources through the NPDES permit program, “has achieved tremendous success 
in controlling point source pollution and restoring the nation’s waters.  By 1990 over 87% of the 
major municipal facilities and 93% of major industrial facilities were in compliance with NPDES 
permit limits.”138  Despite treating one-third more waste, discharges of organic wastes from 
                                                 
136
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  Both decisions 
invalidated federal legislation as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, a result that, before Lopez, the Supreme 
Court had not reached in decades. 
137
 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
138
 U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF WATER, PROPOSED WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY (April 25, 2002) (quoted in 
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 580). 
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publicly-owned waste treatment facilities have dropped 23 percent, while similar discharges 
from industrial facilities have decreased 40 percent.139  Further, as Bill Andreen notes: 
Dissolved oxygen levels have increased downstream from point source discharges all 
over the country, and the improvements are so significant that they can often be discerned 
throughout entire river basins.  The greatest improvements, however, can be seen in many 
rivers and lakes located in urban, industrialized areas, which in the past suffered most 
from point source discharges.  Truly extraordinary progress, therefore, has been 
experienced in places as diverse as the Delaware estuary and the Chattahoochee River, 
New York Harbor, and the Potomac estuary.  The progress, moreover, is not limited to 
just conventional pollutants, but includes heavy metals and toxic water pollutants.140 
As Oliver Houck put it, “[t]he 1972 Amendments worked. . . .  By any measure—number of 
dischargers on permit, pounds of pollution abated, stream segments improved, fisheries restored 
to waters where they had not been seen for decades—the Act has made its case in court and, by 
its imitation, to the world.”141   
 Further, there seems to be widespread agreement that the decision to rely on technology-
based controls instead of an ambient quality-based approach as the principal tool for cleaning up 
the nation’s waters was a wise one.  In general, EPA has had relatively little difficulty identifying 
available technologies for the purpose of establishing effluent limitations, and the elimination of 
the need to prove a cause-and effect link between individual discharges and impaired receiving 
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water quality has facilitated enforcement.142  Moreover, the improvements in water quality 
traceable to the adoption and implementation of the CWA have proven to be affordable.143  
The picture is not entirely rosy, however.  A significant percentage of surface water 
bodies continue to have water quality that is impaired and unsuitable for the uses designated for 
them under state water quality standards.144  More than 240 million pounds of toxic chemicals 
were discharged into the nation’s waters in 2005, with approximately 51 million pounds having 
been released from municipal sewage plants incapable of handling the materials sent to them by 
indirect industrial dischargers covered by the CWA’s pretreatment program.  According to one 
source, “[t]he pretreatment program under the CWA is widely regarded as a failure.  Many 
facilities simply fail to meet pretreatment standards and enforcement [by local governments] is 
lax,” both because of lack of political will and the difficulty of identifying the indirect 
dischargers responsible for interfering with a POTW’s treatment processes.145  The rate at which 
direct dischargers violate their NPDES permits is also alarmingly high.146 
 The largest culprit in the nation’s remaining surface water quality problems, however, is 
nonpoint source pollution.  By the 1980s, as EPA’s technology-based effluent limitations and 
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NPDES permit programs made a significant dent in point source pollution, nonpoint source 
pollution had become the largest contributor to surface water pollution in the United States.147  In 
2002, EPA reported that nonpoint source pollution was the leading cause of the siltation, 
nutrients, bacteria, metals (primarily mercury), and oxygen-depleting substances that are 
responsible for continued impairment of our surface waters.148  Nonpoint source pollution is 
responsible for up to three-quarters of the pollution in the waters with the poorest quality, with 
agricultural activities leading the list as the largest source of nonpoint source pollution.149  J.B. 
Ruhl, who has studied the role of agriculture in surface water pollution extensively, charges that 
“[e]fforts to address nonpoint source water pollution in the CWA and other statutes have been 
feeble, unfocused, and underfunded.”150   
These figures and accounts confirm Congress’s understanding in 1972 that the 
achievement of adequate water quality depended on the control of nonpoint sources and 
condemns its failure to codify an adequate mechanism for doing so.  Two prominent 
environmental law scholars have drawn the conclusion that “one is inevitably left with the 
conclusion that politics has driven the CWA’s failure to take on nonpoint pollution in any 
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meaningful way.  The agricultural lobby, in particular, has been very successful in weakening or 
killing off proposals to regulate nonpoint pollution more rigorously.”151 
 The status of efforts to protect wetlands ecosystems is also a mixed bag.  By one account, 
since the adoption of the CWA in 1972, the rate at which wetlands are lost has declined about 
ninety percent.152  The CWA’s dredge and fill permit program, together with conservation 
programs administered by the Department of Agriculture,153 cut annual wetland losses in the 
United States from an average of 555,000 acres in the mid-1970s to about 58,500 acres twenty 
years later.154  Yet, according to one report, “experts are virtually unanimous that the biggest 
problem facing aquatic ecosystems is not pollution, but the destruction and alteration of aquatic 
habitats.”155  Alyson Flournoy has gone so far as to suggest that it is de facto national policy to 
“allow the destruction of wetlands at a steady pace.”156  This sorry state of affairs may be 
attributed to factors that include the absence of appropriate oversight of activities conducted 
under dredge and fill permits, particularly requirements that permit holders mitigate wetlands 
loses,157 and the shifting jurisdictional parameters of the section 404 program (aided and abetted 
by the splintered and confusing treatment afforded the meaning of “navigable waters” by the 
Supreme Court).  It is not much of a stretch to conclude that the amorphous nature of the goals of 
the section 404 program and Congress’s failure even to mention wetlands in the text of the 1972 
Act have impaired efforts to protect aquatic ecosystems. 
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 B. The Impact of Cooperative Federalism 
 Congress’s decision to enhance the federal government’s role in administering national 
water pollution control legislation has paid significant dividends.  The 1972 legislation has 
performed much better than its 1948 and 1965 predecessors did.  As the discussion above 
indicates, the nationally uniform technology-based effluent limitations for point sources that 
form the core of the CWA’s efforts to combat water pollution, which have performed admirably, 
are largely responsible for that success.158  But the states have not forfeited their role in the 
process of improving water quality.  More than forty states have taken up Congress on its 
invitation to administer the NPDES permit program in lieu of EPA.159 
 If anything, the statutory programs controlled by the states in the first instance have 
increased in importance in recent years.  As EPA brought more and more point sources under the 
umbrella of the technology-based effluent limitations, it became increasingly clear that some 
surface water bodies resisted the improvements envisioned by the CWA.  Many surface water 
bodies failed to comply with state water quality standards, despite implementation of 
technology-based controls for point sources, largely because of continuing nonpoint source 
pollution.  The statutory safety net − in the form of the state water quality standards − has 
therefore taken on a larger role.160  On the one hand, the increasing importance of the state water 
quality standard program makes Congress’s decision not to rely entirely on technology-based 
controls, despite the failure of an ambient quality-based approach before 1972, look like a smart 
one.  On the other hand, had Congress created an effective mechanism for controlling nonpoint 
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source pollution (such as by requiring states to fashion and enforce best management practices 
for nonpoint sources), a statutory safety net may not have been as necessary.161 
 State efforts to implement the water quality standard program have not gone smoothly.  
The statute requires that states with surface water bodies that do not satisfy state water quality 
standards (known as impaired waters) adopt total maximum daily loads (TMDLs).162  A TMDL 
represents the maximum assimilative capacity of the receiving water body to which it applies; 
aggregate discharges above the TMDL will result in pollutant concentrations higher than those 
deemed necessary to achieve the designated use.163  States must limit aggregate discharges by 
point and nonpoint sources to an amount equal or less than that allowed by the TMDL.  But 
many states ignored their TMDL designation responsibilities for reasons that include funding 
shortages and lack of political will.164  To combat this torpor, environmental groups resorted to 
citizen suits in which they sought court orders mandating that EPA fulfill its nondiscretionary 
duty to promulgate TMDLs for states that have failed to do so.165  Although the results in these 
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suits have been mixed,166 there is little question that implementation of the TMDL program 
would be even further behind if not for the availability of citizen suits to spur recalcitrant 
agencies to perform their water quality-related obligations.167  This outcome seems to support the 
value of Congress’s choice to include in the CWA a citizen suit provision as a means of 
combating agency inertia. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The lofty goals Congress set when it adopted the CWA have not yet been met, although 
significant progress toward them has occurred.  It is not the function of this article to assay what 
the next steps should be in moving to complete the journey toward a no discharge world in which 
aquatic ecosystems thrive; that is the assigned task of Robert Adler, the author of the companion 
piece to this article in this volume.  Several points seem obvious, however.  First, it will take 
more to eliminate the impaired status of those water bodies that do not currently meet state water 
quality standards than cracking down harder on point sources through more rigorous technology-
based controls (although better enforcement of existing permits and the effluent limitations they 
contain would help).  Instead, a meaningful system of controlling nonpoint sources is essential.  
Congress must work with the state and local governments to overcome the political barriers that 
have thus far thwarted efforts to extract from nonpoint sources the same commitments to 
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reducing discharges that the CWA has already demanded of point sources.  Second, a resolution 
of the definitional quandary over what kinds of waters and wetlands the CWA covers is essential.  
It is essential to dispel the current “miasma of uncertainty”168 cast over the meaning of 
“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States” by the Supreme Court’s fractured and 
confounding opinions in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County and Rapanos. 
 One possible approach to dealing with both of those issues is to focus on protecting the 
integrity of watersheds.  EPA has defined a watershed-based approach as one that “focuses 
multi-stakeholder efforts within hydrologically defined boundaries to protect and restore our 
aquatic resources and ecosystems. . . .”169  The agency has identified several basic components 
of a watershed-based effort to improve water quality.  These include the division of the states 
into natural geographic management areas; the adoption of phased regulatory and non-regulatory 
actions within each watershed area, including monitoring, assessment, planning, and 
implementation; the integration of CWA and other water resource programs; and a process that 
enables stakeholder participation.170  A watershed-oriented focus makes sense because, as Holly 
Doremus has pointed out, “[t]he core of the current problem is . . . our failure to bridge the land-
water interface and other artificial boundaries we’ve created.”171  Whether TMDLs can provide 
the “backbone” of such a watershed-based approach172 or a different approach is needed is a 
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question that is beyond the scope of our assignment for this symposium, but it will be interesting 
to see how the answer crafted by environmental policymakers in the coming years conforms to 
the initial assumptions on which the CWA was enacted. 
